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The Multipillar System for Health Care Financing: 
Thirteen Good Reasons for Open Capitalisation Funds, 
Covering both Pension and Health Care Provisions 
 
CeRM recommendation for creating a new tool, the Open Welfare Funds: 
open funds based on real capitalisation of contributions, dedicated to both pension 
and health care provisions, and linked to collective insurance coverage against 
major health risks (first of all lack of self-sufficiency) 
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Abstract 
 
Within welfare systems, health care is the expenditure that poses the most urgent problems for 
long term sustainability. Without policy interventions and structural reforms, its physiological 
tendency towards increases over Gdp will inevitably require access restrictions and cutting off 
of demand for services. 
 
This paper highlights the need to renew the current health care financing scheme. In the 
presence of ageing populations and rising incidences of health care expenditures over Gdp, this 
scheme cannot remain fully in charge of the working income of active people (pay-as-you-go), if 
we want to avoid depressive effects on employment, investments and productivity. Such effects, 
besides hampering economic growth, would have a negative impact on health care itself, with 
resources becoming more and more scarce with respect to needs. 
 
The financing scheme must become multipillar, with pay-as-you-go complemented by a private 
channel based on the real capitalisation of contributions. This channel would be capable of 
allocating savings, supporting productive investments and generating resources to be dedicated 
to health care. 
 
The best structuring and concrete functioning of the private pillar is less clear and under 
discussion. This position paper puts forward an operational proposal: the open capitalisation 
fund for welfare should offer both pension and health care provisions through real accumulation 
of contributions on individual accounts, and should be linked to collective insurance coverage 
against major risks and lack of self-sufficiency. 
 
This tool presents numerous positive characteristics, compared to the public pay-as-you-go 
monopillar as well as to a multipillar system in which the private component consists 
exclusively or mainly of insurance contracts. In fact, it is necessary to restrict the recourse to 
pure insurance coverage only to a limited group of treatments, because this kind of coverage is 
not equipped to deal with the dynamics of future expenses. As the difficulties American 
insurance companies are experiencing demonstrate, the pure insurance coverage ends up with 
the recurrence, in the private area, of the same defects as the pay-as-you-go in the public health 
care systems. Insurance pooling is not but a pay-as-you-go scheme applied over the group of 
insured members. 
 
An open and conclusive debate is necessary. 
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The Italian population will age faster than many other European population. In 2007 the 
dependency ratio (the ratio between non versus working age people is 51.5 percent, against 
48.6 in the Eu-25 and 49 in the Eu-15. This gap will likely increase. In 2050 the ratio will be 
86.8 percent, against 77.1 in the Eu-15 according to the Eurostat central demographic scenario, 
and 94.3 percent against 83.1 in the Eu-15 according to the most intense aging scenario. This 
profound reshaping of the demographic pyramid will not only cause changes in the economic 
sector and in the society, but will also induce disproportionate flows of resources between 
generations will emerge, particularly in terms of financing of pension and health care systems. 
 
 
 
 
1. Inadequacy of the Monopillar Paygo System  
 
 
In Italy, pensions and health care are financed almost entirely on a pay-as-you-go basis, that 
means through resources taken yearly from the incomes of workers. 
Considering the long term projections for pension expenditure (Ecofin) and health care (Oecd), 
together with Eurostat demographic projections, in 2050 every working age citizen will have to 
contribute an amount equal to 50 percent of per capita Gdp (today it is 30). 
Even in the optimistic hypothesis of achieving the labour market goals set at the Lisbon and 
Stockholm European Councils, the burden on every employed person would exceed 70 percent 
of per capita Gdp. If instead the employment rates were to remain as they are today, this burden 
would be much heavier, close to 100 percent, because for every employed person there would 
be 1.5 persons (children and the elderly) to be supported (today 0.85). 
These huge disproportions will take place, to different extents, in all industrialized countries, 
and are bound to produce distorting effects on labour markets, investments and production. 
Pay-as-you go financing schemes can no longer rely any more on the so-called Aaron’s 
theorem, which, given a young and growing population, states that yearly contributions paid by 
all working people were the best possible solution for both transferring resources across  
generations (pensions) and sustaining universalistic provisions (health care systems). 
 
 
 
 
2. Development of the Complementary Capitalisation Pillar 
 
 
In order to rebalance the pay-as-you-go scheme, for both pensions and health care, it is 
necessary to develop a complementary pillar based on real capitalisation, that provides 
resources for facing future expenditures through the accumulation, supported by tax relief, of 
long term investments on individual accounts. 
In Italy, the debate on the limits of pay-as-you-go schemes has focused almost exclusively on 
pensions. For these, even though the private pillar still displays an insufficient dimension and its 
normative framework is far from complete, a certain awareness of the problem has been 
reached. On the contrary, for health care the road to a solution still appears long, despite the 
fact that the multipillar diversification appears more necessary than for pensions. 
In Italy, while public pension expenditure is slowly stabilising over Gdp, public health care 
expenditure, without policy correction, could potentially double or more than double its 
incidence (from approximately 6.8 percent of Gdp to 15-16 in 2050). In the mid-long term, the 
dynamics of the two items will create two different problems: for pensions a problem of social 
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sustainability, if the employment rates fail to close the gaps with respect to the Eu Partners, 
working life will not be lengthened and the private pillar will not manage to integrate 
sufficiently; while for health care a real and true financial problem, that is unbearable pressure 
on the public budget. 
The development of the private pillar would also bring positive effects in terms of incentives to 
work, productivity, and the lengthening of active life, from the moment that, boosted by tax 
relief, the single adherent’s savings would accumulate to his advantage only, with his rights to 
the fruits thereof guaranteed. From this point of view, the private pillar in health care would 
reinforce the virtuous properties of the rules of notional capitalisation calculation introduced by 
the “Dini” pensions reform of 1995. 
 
 
 
 
3. A Proposal: Open Capitalisation Funds for Welfare 
 
 
In order to promote the development of a financing channel based on real accumulation, it 
would be useful to reflect on the possibility of a convergence of the two complementary 
coverage: the pension one and that for health care, for both acute and long term care 
provisions. 
This is a subject that concerns primarily the funds rather than insurance plans, because the 
formers have, through simplification, standardisation and critical mass, higher potentialities of 
lowering administrative and managing costs.  
By combining pension and health care aims, it would be possible to borrow the actual pension 
funds structure directly, for then completing and perfecting it. More specifically, the three goals 
- pensions, acute health care and long term care -  could refer to the same legal subject, 
identifiable as <open capitalisation welfare fund>, operating through the real accumulation of 
contributions on members’ individual accounts, and linked to collective insurance coverage 
against major health risks and lack of self-sufficiency. 
Incidentally, the current Italian legislation already allows pension funds to pursue aims of a 
health/socio-health nature by disinvesting a predefined percentage of accumulated capital, or by 
using a percentage of member’s contributions to buy an insurance coverage against major 
critical events, and in particular the lack of self-sufficiency. 
 
 
 
 
4. The Possible Advantages of Open Capitalisation Funds for 
Welfare 
 
 
Several advantages can be derived from the introduction of open capitalisation welfare funds: 
 
1. Homogenization of tax treatment would produce transparency and 
effectiveness for fiscal incentives, which today are different for pension and 
health care funds. It would be possible to concentrate on the tax detraction 
scheme that, as the Oecd suggests, is capable of attracting wider groups of 
workers, while favouring a better control of tax expenditure;  
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2. Today, both health and pension funds compete for the same financial 
resources: the contributions of employees and of sponsor companies, the 
contributions from members independently of their work situation, and the 
severance pay. Open welfare funds would channel these resources into a single 
accumulation programme; 
 
3. The open welfare fund would open up possibilities for lowering administration 
and managing costs, and above all it would make integrated management of 
financial flows possible, both capable of making the most of the benefits of the 
capitalisation over mid-long term periods, and of carrying out a broad 
diversification of risks; 
 
4. With regard to the supply of services, the performance of the various functions 
could be guaranteed in conditions of greater flexibility, efficiency and 
effectiveness: 
 
4.1 Parts of the resources accumulated within the fund could be disinvested in 
the course of a member’s working life, within limits and for specific 
purposes, to enable meeting personal and family health care expenses. In 
particular, a given amount could be dedicated, year by year, to finance 
copayments for the access to health care services provided by the public 
health care system. Resources to finance copayments would be deducted 
from the accumulation on member’s individual account, meaning that 
copayment schemes would not lose their positive properties of demand 
and supply regulation (see following point 4.8)1; 
 
4.2 For acute health treatments which involve high costs (either because they 
are not provided by the public sector or because accompanied by high 
copayments), as well as for socio-health cares (first of all, the lack of self-
sufficiency), it would be possible to buy, as a particular asset of the fund, a 
collective insurance coverage for all members, paying premiums by 
disinvesting, year by year, a part of the capital accumulated in the 
individual accounts2. It is necessary to apply pure insurance coverage only 
to a limited group of treatments, because this kind of coverage is not 
equipped to deal with the dynamics of future expenses. As the difficulties 
American insurance companies are experiencing demonstrate, the pure 
insurance coverage ends up with the recurrence, in the private area, of the 
same defects as the pay-as-you-go in the public health care systems. 
Insurance pooling is not but a pay-as-you-go scheme applied over the 
group of insured members; 
 
4.3 Using a portion of the capital accumulated at the moment of retirement, 
the fund may buy a collective insurance coverage against the risk of lack 
of self-sufficiency for the whole period of the members’ retirement; 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 This point is of great importance in the light of the moving from the absolute toward the selective universalism. 
2 Minor health care expenses can be directly financed using resources withdrawn from the accumulation. For bigger 
expenses (such as for lack of self-sufficiency), it is essential to maintain a pure insurance coverage, so as not to over 
weaken the accumulation program. This is the rationale for the link between the open fund, based on the accumulation 
of individual contributions on individual accounts, and the acquisition of collective insurances as part of the assets of 
the fund. 
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4.4 Since one of the aspects considered less satisfactory for pension funds (at 
least in current Italian legislation) is the rigidity of the subdivision of 
accumulated resources between an annuity and an una tantum capital, it 
would be possible to allow a wider access to una tantum to members who, 
by adhering to the collective insurance cover against lack of self-
sufficiency, already pursue part of the insurance finality associated with 
the constitution of an annuity; 
 
4.5 Collective insurance contracts would have the advantages of lowering 
individual negotiation costs for members, and of facilitating risk exposure 
management on the part of insurance companies; 
 
4.6 Collective insurance contracts, moreover, would reduce the distortion 
caused by adverse selection on the part of members (those most exposed 
to adverse events tend more often to nee health treatments), and the 
distortion by excess of screaming by insurance companies (coverage is 
preferably offered to those less at risk). In some cases, this distortion may 
even mean that the company refuses to insure; 
 
4.7 These virtuous effects, described in the two preceding paragraphs, would 
be enhanced if the fund, though maintaining voluntary membership, had a 
legal obligation to subscribe a collective insurance coverage for the risk of 
lack of self-sufficiency of all its members (a sort of condition to obtain tax 
benefits). In this case, the risk to incur in an adverse event would be 
spread over a much larger group of persons of different ages (all those who 
in the meantime are contributing to the complementary pension); 
 
4.8 Finally, with the open fund the member would have a greater sense of 
responsibility toward the disinvesting of resources from the fund to finance 
the access to health care provisions. In fact, those resources would 
continue to accumulate within the individual capitalisation account, 
creating future pension benefits. The full appropriability of the resources, 
accrued on the personal account, reduces the likelihood of opportunistic 
behaviours of moral hazard; 
 
5. The open nature of the fund would not impede the allowance, besides the 
individual adhesions, of collective adhesions by whole groups (employees of a 
company, workers of a sector, of a territory ...). Together with the complete 
portability of individual positions (even in the case of collective adhesion), the 
open nature of the funds can work as a constant stimulus for transparency and 
cost efficiency; 
 
6. Another advantage can be added to those listed. Within an appropriate 
normative and regulatory framework, the open welfare funds would have the 
right characteristics for carrying out the function of choosing the best health 
care, and channelling the demand of their members towards them, whether 
public or private. A mechanism which, supported by detailed and certified 
information on funds performance and of the suppliers that the funds choose, 
could promote not only cost efficiency, but also quality in services. Moreover 
putting public and private suppliers in positive competition could contribute to 
reset that border between the political and the health care organisation spheres 
in Italy, that is all too often a very grey are often a too grey area. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
A new tool, such as the one suggested in this position paper, certainly requires a detailed plan 
and also an innovative effort on the part of financial managers and insurance companies.  
 
Nevertheless, the convergence of pension and health funds can open important possibilities for 
the reform of the financing structure of the two major items of welfare expenditure. It could 
bring about the decisive impulse for the development of a complementary private pillar based 
on the real accumulation of contributions on the markets, and integrated with collective 
insurance coverage for those health expenditures which, by their very nature, cannot be 
financed only by the accumulation of resources in individual accounts, but need to rely solely 
on a pure insurance scheme. 
 
Open welfare funds would have the merit of rebalancing the pay-as-you-go scheme on which 
most welfare systems today rely. Moreover, through the more suitable combination of tax 
incentives and collective insurance coverage for major health expenses, the development of 
open welfare funds would not contrast with but, on the contrary, reinforce those principles of 
solidarity and cohesion which are at the grounds of welfare systems. And this is especially true 
in the presence of ageing populations and rising incidences of health care expenditures over 
Gdp. 
 
The proposal for open welfare funds deserves to be closely examined technically, socially and 
politically. 
